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 i 
Abstract 
 
 The 2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement in the National Hockey League limits 
contracts offered to free agents in terms of length and variance in yearly salary. These changes 
have made finding undervalued free agents even more important to teams’ general managers. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate players and teams with both traditional and advanced 
metrics to determine how players are valued in comparison to their impact on their team’s 
performance. 
 A team’s winning percentage is hypothesized to be a function of shooting percentage and 
save percentage, as well as proxies for puck possession time, such as shots on goal per game, 
shots against per game, blocked shots, missed shots, and face-off percentage.  It is also 
hypothesized that players with higher puck possession attributes will impact a team’s winning 
percentage to a greater extent than those with lower metrics, and so should be a key factor in 
determining how general managers use available salary money to improve their team. 
 Based on data from NHL.com and stats.hockeyanalysis.com, we estimate team 
performance of all 30 NHL teams for each of the six previous seasons of play (2007-2013) as a 
function of puck possession proxies. We find that puck possession proxies significantly impact a 
team’s winning percentage and that free agents with higher performance metrics have a 
significantly greater impact on team performance.  
performance as much as several less expensive players in cases that a team lacks depth. 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Glossary 
Shots on Goal (SoG): Number of Shots per game that reach the opponents net, including all 
goals and shots that would have resulted in goals had the opposing goaltender not made a 
save 
Shots Against (SAoG): Number of Shots per game taken by an opponent that reach a 
team’s net, including all goals and shots that would have resulted in goals had the 
goaltender not made a save 
Shot Percentage (SP): (Goals)/(Shots on Goal) 
Save Percentage (SVP): (Saves)/(Shots on Goal) 
Blocked Shots (BSG): Any shot attempted by an opponent and blocked by a player other 
than the goaltender 
Missed Shots (MSG): Any attempted shot that does not reach the net and is not blocked 
Corsi (Cor): Total shots per game (Shots on Goal, Missed Shots, Blocked Shots) by a team 
or player 
Corsi Percentage (CP): (Total Shots)/(Total Shots + Total Shots Against) 
Fenwick (Fen): Shots on Goal plus Missed Shots (Corsi minus Blocked Shots) by a team or 
player 
Fenwick Percentage (FP): (Fenwick)/(Fenwick + Opponents’ Fenwick) 
Face-Off Percentage (FOP): (Team Face-Offs won)/(Total Face-Offs) 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 The ultimate goal of every professional sports franchise is to win the league 
championship. Every general manager is tasked with assembling a team that will ultimately 
contend for a playoff title. Obviously, the task can be long or short term. This is the reason 
many teams will trade a star player for prospects as it increases the probability for success 
in the future while the team’s immediate success may be hindered. The signing of players 
by any general manager has many factors; however, insight into how specific players help a 
team win is certainly paramount. Sabermetrics attempt to quantify how a player or players 
impact a team’s performance. The field of sabermetrics has grown in recent years with the 
success of the Oakland Athletics and Boston Red Sox and has increasingly proliferated into 
sports other than baseball.1 Because advanced statistical analysis can help general 
managers make decisions on how to allocate dollars when being confined by a salary cap, it 
is of critical importance when determining how to build a team. It is most critical in leagues 
that institute a ‘hard’ salary cap, as the National Hockey League (NHL) implemented in the 
2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In the National Hockey League, the ultimate 
goal of every team is to win the Stanley Cup.   
 The purpose of this study is to determine correlations of performance statistics to 
point percentage as well as how NHL general managers can use this information to make 
decisions on acquiring players in free agency and through trades. The study shifts focus 
away from the obvious drivers of players’ salaries such as goals and assists, and on to puck 
                                                        
1 Hakes, John K., and Raymond D. Sauer. 2007 
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possession statistics in order to find value where other general managers may not be 
looking. 
 The research is critical, as NHL general managers have had contract limits imposed 
with the 2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement. This has eliminated loopholes used by 
general managers when signing free agents. Understanding the nature of free agency and 
what types of signings have had significant impacts on team performance will better inform 
general managers about the value that can be added to their team in the free agent market. 
For this reason, a detailed study of Stanley Cup Finalists over the past six years will be 
analyzed to better understand how the teams were put together. In addition, specific case 
studies will be analyzed to determine how free agent signings and/or trades may have 
impacted the team’s performance.  
 
Outline of the Study 
 In the second chapter we present the institutional and historical context of 
managing a professional hockey organization. We first discuss critical changes in the last 
two NHL Collective Bargaining Agreements, including an introduction to the rules and 
regulations of how hockey players are acquired by clubs, as well as organizational salary 
caps and player contract limits. We then explain of how the minor league system impacts 
the NHL club. 
 In the third chapter we examine team performance statistics that may positively or 
negatively impact point percentage. This includes finding an adequate proxy for puck 
possession. Other statistics that we analyze include face-offs, turnovers, shots for and 
against, save percentage, and shooting percentage. This analytical framework provides the 
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context for a model in which future team performance can be analyzed, as well as a 
framework for what types of players may have a higher impact on team performance.  
 In the fourth chapter we introduce the sources for the sample data.  We estimate 
team performance statistics through the model to determine magnitudes of impact on 
point percentage. Next, we analyze the regression results. Finally, we analyze the impact of 
puck possession for Stanley Cup finalists and teams that experienced drastic improvement 
in winning percentage from one year to the next. 
 In the fifth chapter we conclude that advanced statistics can be used in order to 
inform general about player acquisitions. We determine that the best teams have built their 
core in the draft while acquiring role players in free agency. 
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Chapter 2 
The NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement and Framework of Professional Hockey  
The 2013 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement 
 The NHL established a ‘hard’ salary cap after a lockout cancelled the 2004-05 
season. Previously, the NHL did not institute any salary cap, and was the last of the major 
North American sports to institute a salary cap or luxury tax in order to control players’ 
salaries. The hard salary cap prevents any club from exceeding a payroll limit for any 
reason, and differs from a ‘soft’ salary cap, which allows teams to exceed the limit but with 
a penalty such as a luxury tax. When the 2005 CBA expired in September of 2012 owners 
wanted to make it easier to fill rosters without inflating salaries further. This caused the 
league to create a new calculation of the salary cap based on league revenue, cutting the 
salary cap from $64.3 million in 2011-12 to $60 million in 2012-13. The salary cap will 
move back up to $64.3 million for the 2013-14 season, in essence creating a two-year 
freeze on salary inflation.2 The new formula estimates league revenue for the upcoming 
season. The league separates its revenue streams into “hockey-related revenue” and  
“non-hockey-related revenue”.  
Of importance to the salary cap calculation is hockey-related revenue. Exhibit 1 is a 
list of what is deemed hockey-related revenue under the 2013 NHL CBA.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013 
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Exhibit 1: NHL CBA Hockey Related Revenue 
1) NHL Regular Season & Playoff Gate Receipts 
2) Pre-Season Games 
3) Special Games (International Exhibition Games, etc) 
4) NHL National, International and National Digital Broadcasts 
5) NHL Networks 
6) Local Cable Television Broadcasts 
7) Local Pay-Per-View, Satellite and Other Broadcasts 
8) Local Over-the-Air Television Broadcasts 
9) Local Radio Broadcasts 
10) Club Internet 
11) Publications 
12) In-Arena Novelty Sales 
13) Non-Arena Novelty Sales 
14) Concessions 
15) Luxury Boxes/Suites 
16) Club/Premium Seats 
17) Fixed Signage/Arena Sponsorships 
18) Temporary Signage/Club Sponsorships 
19) Dasherboards 
20) Parking 
21) Other Revenues (sale of game-worn jerseys, skills competitions, open practices, etc) 
 
Fifty percent of hockey related revenue is allowed for player salaries, down from 57 
percent in the previous CBA. From there a “midpoint” for the projected salary range is 
estimated. The salary cap is set at 15 percent above the midpoint, while the floor is set at 
15 percent below the midpoint. The range between the salary cap and salary floor for NHL 
teams is not to be under $16 million and is not to exceed $28 million. With a tighter budget 
in terms of player salaries, NHL general managers must be able to make more informed 
decisions than ever on what signings will help their organization the most as they have 
fewer dollars to build their teams. 
 The smaller cap is compounded by the elimination of contract length loopholes that 
allowed general managers to lure attractive free agents more easily. Previously, the NHL 
allowed general managers to sign players to extremely long contracts in order to 
circumvent the salary cap. For example, Lou Lamoriello of the New Jersey Devils signed 
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forward Ilya Kovalchuk to a 15-year, $100 million contract in 2010.3 About $80 million was 
to be paid within the first 8 years of the contract, but because the cap hit of a player takes 
into account the average salary made by the player over the length of the contract, 
Kovalchuk’s “cap hit” was $6,666,667.4 In response, the 2013 CBA limits contract lengths to 
seven years (eight years if the team is re-signing its own player). In addition, the NHL also 
included a contract variance rule. Player salaries cannot vary by more than 35% from one 
year to the next, while the lowest annual salary earned by a player cannot be less than 50% 
of the highest annual salary earned by the player under the same contract. 
 General managers must also deal with several forms of free agency. Based on a 
player’s age and NHL games played, a player may be considered restricted or unrestricted. 
Any player that is 27 years old or older or has 7 years of NHL experience is considered an 
unrestricted free agent. Unrestricted free agents are able to sign with any NHL club for any 
salary, so long as the team’s payroll does not exceed the salary cap and does not exceed the 
limit of 50 contracted players. Restricted free agents can obtain qualifying offers from other 
teams—it is then the choice of the player’s previous team to match the qualifying offer and 
keep the player or to let him sign the offering.5 
 In addition, the NHL CBA limits the contracts of entry-level players. Any player 
signing their first contract and under the age of 25 is subject to these limits. Length of the 
contract is determined by age. If the player is 21 or under, the length must be 3 years; if the 
player is 22 or 23, the contract length is 2 years while 24-year-olds receive a one-year 
contract. The maximum salary for an entry-level player is $925,000 while the minimum is 
                                                        
3 Mazzeo, Mike. 2013 
4 Capgeek.com. 2013 
5 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013 
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the same as the league minimum of $525,000.6 Entry-level contracts must be two-way. This 
means the player makes substantially less money if he is placed in the minor leagues; 
however, he cannot be claimed off waivers when the NHL team assigns him to the minor 
leagues. 
 All NHL contracts are guaranteed. This means that waiving or cutting a player does 
not free a team from financial obligations to the player’s salary. NHL teams are allowed to 
buyout the remainder of a player’s contract. A player can be bought out of his contract for 
one-third of his remaining salary due if he is under the age of 26. If the player is over 26, he 
must be paid two-thirds of his remaining salary. The team has two times the length of the 
remaining contract to make these payments. The buyout amount is calculated in the teams 
salary cap limit evenly across the length of the buyout payments.7  
 Teams acquiring a player through a trade must assume at least half of the player’s 
remaining salary. A previous team can only retain a player’s salary twice over the course of 
the contract and the retained salary cannot exceed 15 percent of the upper salary cap limit. 
Finally, a team is only allowed three retained contracts to be on its books at a particular 
time and is not allowed to renegotiate player contracts if the player was acquired in a trade. 
These rules were put in place in order to prevent wealthier teams from acquiring players 
and evading salary cap rules.8  
 The restrictions introduced in the 2005 NHL CBA and enhanced in the 2013 NHL 
CBA has made every dollar a general manager spends more important. In addition, the 
closing of many loopholes has made the idea of finding a ‘diamond in the rough’ much more 
                                                        
6 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013 
7 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013 
8 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013 
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fruitful as the new CBA has made it more difficult to acquire a large number of players 
valued highly in the market. With a defined amount of money, general managers must be 
able to decide firstly what areas of the team need to be improved and the value of players 
available in free agency to fill the team’s needs. The depth of the organization’s prospect 
pool compounds these decisions further. 
 
Player Development and Organizational Depth 
 Every NHL team has an affiliate team in the American Hockey League (AHL). The 
AHL is considered the premier minor hockey league, only being topped in skill level by the 
NHL. The AHL is used as a “farm system” for the NHL. On opening day of the 2013 season, 
630 players on NHL rosters had played in the AHL, accounting for 84 percent of all NHL 
players.9 NHL rosters are not to exceed 23 healthy players; however, teams are allowed up 
to 50 players under contract. Most players under contract, but not on the NHL roster, are 
on the AHL roster. This allows the organization to easily fill roster spots vacated by injury 
or poor performance. 
 The AHL allows organizations to develop prospects, acquired in the draft or through 
trades and free agency. For smaller market teams it is imperative to develop players as 
many of their high-end players will sign with another team when they become free agents. 
Although all teams are bound by the salary cap and the 50-contract limit, large market 
teams hold in advantage in attracting high-priced free agents as they often have greater 
revenues from ticket and merchandise sales. This allows large market teams to pay more 
for the services of a star player. However, star players are often overpriced. Although goals 
                                                        
9 http://theahl.com/630-ahl-grads-open-season-in-nhl-p187541 
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and assists are valued the most in the free agent market, it is entirely possible a player who 
is a 30-goal scorer with one team scores only 10 goals with another team the next year. 
Other metrics must be studied to determine how a general manager can spend money most 
efficiently. Ultimately, every NHL team’s goal is to win the Stanley Cup. The goal of this 
study is to determine how a general manager can build a potential Stanley Cup-winning 
team with limited resources.  
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Chapter 3 
Measures and Determinants of Team Performance 
Point Percentage: A Measure of Team Performance 
 Point percentage in the NHL is defined differently from winning percentage in other 
leagues. The NHL awards 2 points for a win, 1 point for an overtime or shootout loss, and 0 
points for a regulation loss. Exhibit 2 shows how point percentage is calculated. 
 
 
Point percentage is used in the NHL because losing a game may still gain a team a point in 
the standings. This is due to the NHL no longer allowing ties, yet still awarding points to a 
team that did not lose in regulation. This is the most effective measure of team 
performance over an entire season as a team’s point total determines whether or not it 
makes the playoffs and has a chance to compete for the Stanley Cup. 
 
Determinants of Performance 
Sabermetrics: Fenwick and Corsi 
 Sabermetrics is the term used to describe the empirical examination of sports 
centered on statistical analysis. The scientific analysis of baseball was first put in the 
national spotlight in 1964 when Earnshaw Cook published Percentage Baseball. Although, 
Exhibit 2: Calculation of Point Percentage 
Point Percentage = Total Points 
                                      Total Possible Points 
 
Total Possible Points = 2*Games Played 
 
Point Percentage = Total Points 
   2*Games Played 
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originally dismissed by Major League Baseball teams, the field gained traction through the 
second half of the 20th century with the work of Bill James who coined the term 
sabermetrics itself. Baseball lent itself to statistical analysis because of the nature of the 
game—it is a one-on-one game within a team sport. With the success of open sabermetric 
proponents Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics and Theo Epstein of the Boston Red Sox in 
the early 2000’s, researchers began attempting to uncover statistical formulas for winning 
in other sports.10 This has led to the proliferation of advanced statistics in many sports, 
including hockey.  
Of particular interest to this study are Fenwick percentage and Corsi percentage, 
both of which are statistics used to measure the number of shots attempted by a team.11 
Fenwick is defined as shots on goal plus missed shots, while Corsi is defined as all 
attempted shots (Fenwick plus blocked shots). These are of particular interest as proxies 
for puck possession. In theory, the sport of hockey comes down to puck possession. When 
one team has the puck, the other cannot score. Therefore, whoever has the puck more 
should have more attempted shots, more scoring chances, more goals, and therefore more 
wins. It is important to note that a team does not win because of a high Fenwick or Corsi 
percentage, but by the process that a high Fenwick or Corsi percentage requires. This 
means a coach should not necessarily preach to shoot the puck from anywhere on the ice. 
Yes, this would increase both the team’s Fenwick and Corsi percentages; however, it 
renders them useless as a puck possession proxy. Fenwick and Corsi percentages compare 
the amount of attempted shots by a team and their opponents.12 Because the percentages 
                                                        
10 Fry, Michael J., and Jeffery W. Ohlmann. 2012 
11 Wagner, Daniel. 2013 
12 stats.hockeyanalysis.com. 2013 
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contain both an offensive and defensive aspect, they will be used in the regression models. 
However, Fenwick and Corsi percentages are not available specifically for players and 
therefore players will be compared in terms of Fenwick of Corsi per game. As puck 
possession proxies their merits should still hold as a player who has higher Fenwick or 
Corsi values allows his opponents less time with the puck.  
 
Traditional Statistics 
 Just as Fenwick and Corsi are theorized to be correlated to point percentage, 
traditional statistics that contribute to puck possession are hypothesized to impact a team’s 
success. Traditional statistics that impact puck possession include face-off percentage, 
turnovers, and takeaways. The fewer turnovers a team commits, the longer it will have the 
puck. Similarly the more takeaways and face-offs won by a team will contribute to more 
puck possession. These statistics are not considered drivers of players’ salaries; however, 
they could have a large impact on the success of a team. 
 Shots on goal and shots against on goal are both taken into account in Fenwick 
percentage and Corsi percentage, and for this reason they will not be included in the 
regression model. However, shooting percentage and save percentage are not intrinsic to 
Fenwick or Corsi and therefore will be included in the regression model. 
 Statistics that have a large impact on both salaries and the success of a team are 
goals and assists. It makes the most sense as the more goals a team scores, the more games 
that team is likely to win. However, we are concerned about metrics that may relate to 
more goals for and fewer against, therefore improving point percentage. Because goals and 
goals against are obviously correlated to wins and because players known as goal scorers 
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are able to obtain high salaries, both goals and assists will not be included in the regression 
model. Because goal scorers are often the highest paid players in the NHL a general 
manager could be better off to acquire multiple players for the same price as a single star 
player. This is dependant on the types of players already on a roster. 
 
Roles within a Hockey Team 
 One reason sabermetrics are successful in analyzing baseball is because the basic 
role of every batter is the same and the basic role of every pitcher is the same. Batters are 
tasked with getting on base, while pitchers keep them off the bases. It is an individual game 
within a team game. This is very different from hockey in which five players on a team need 
to work as a unit to score and prevent the other team from doing so. The sixth player, the 
goaltender, is the only player tasked with only one job—prevent the opponent from 
scoring. Because of the fluidity and teamwork involved in hockey, players have different 
roles. They are broken down in Exhibit 3. 
Exhibit 3: Simplified Roles of Players 
Position Task Salary 
Skilled Forwards Score, top two lines most often High 
Two-Way Forwards Prevent opponenent from scoring, occasionally score Moderate to Low 
Offensive Defensemen Create scoring opportunities, prevent opp. scoring High to Moderate 
Defensive Defensemen Prevent opponent from scoring Moderate to Low 
Goaltenders Prevent opponent from scoring High to Low 
 
Because teams may have different numbers of different types of players, general managers 
can easily value the same player differently. For example, a team with only one offensive 
defenseman would most likely value a second more than a team that already has three 
offensive defensemen. Because only two defensemen are on the ice at a time, the fourth 
offensive defensemen offers a lower return than the second. 
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Team Chemistry and Variance 
 Along with different roles, players themselves may fit differently in one team 
compared to another. For example, an offensive player may not perform as well under a 
coach who stresses defense. Similarly, a player may put up great numbers when playing on 
the same line as one teammate, yet be less productive when playing with others. These 
“chemistry factors” and others may create a substantial amount of variance that is 
extremely difficult to quantify.  
 
Regression Model 
 Both sabermetrics and traditional statistics will be used in the regression models. 
The first model will include Fenwick percentage while the second will include Corsi 
percentage. They will not be included together because they are highly correlated. The 
regression model is based on the model used by Hakes and Sauer (2007).  
 
Regression Model: 
 PP = α + β1Proxy + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG +  ε 
Where: PP = Point Percentage; Proxy = Puck Possession; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting 
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game 
 
  
Point percentage is the most viable and readily available measurement of team 
performance and is therefore used as the dependent variable in both models. The model 
will estimate the impact of each performance statistic on point percentage and therefore 
indicate what statistics should be heavily valued in the free agent market. This will allow 
general managers to make informed decisions on how a certain player may impact the 
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team’s performance. In the models, we expect coefficients on Proxy, CP, FOP, SP, SVP, and 
TAG to be positive and the coefficient on TOG to be negative. 
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Chapter 4 
Evaluation of Statistics as Determinants of Team Performance 
 
Sources and Measurement of Data 
 The data comes from the 2007-08 Season through the 2012-13 Season. The 2012-13 
Season was shortened by a lockout and therefore measurements are evaluated on a ‘per 
game’ basis in order to eliminate any bias. The 2007-08 Season was the first season in 
which advanced statistics such as Corsi and Fenwick are readily available. All thirty NHL 
franchises are observed in each season’s data set. 
 Data collected for each team includes: Fenwick percentage, Corsi percentage, faceoff 
percentage, shooting percentage, save percentage, turnovers per game, takeaways per 
game, powerplay time and the dependent variable, point percentage. Fenwick percentage 
and Corsi percentage are collected from stats.hockeyanalysis.com13 while all other 
statistics are from the NHL’s website.14 The descriptive statistics are reported in Exhibit 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 stats.hockeyanalysis.com. 2013 
14 www.nhl.com/ice/teamstats.htm. 2013  
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Exhibit 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Point Percentage  Takeaways per Game  
Mean 55.858 Mean 6.843 
Standard Deviation 7.963 Standard Deviation 1.405 
Minimum 37.200 Minimum 1.000 
Maximum 80.200 Maximum 11.560 
Shooting Percentage  Turnovers per Game  
Mean 7.766 Mean 8.062 
Standard Deviation 0.881 Standard Deviation 1.857 
Minimum 5.490 Minimum 4.460 
Maximum 10.520 Maximum 12.870 
Save Percentage  Corsi Percentage  
Mean 92.229 Mean 49.991 
Standard Deviation 0.952 Standard Deviation 3.269 
Minimum 89.320 Minimum 41.900 
Maximum 94.470 Maximum 59.500 
Faceoff Percentage  Fenwick Percentage  
Mean 49.996 Mean 49.961 
Standard Deviation 2.025 Standard Deviation 3.219 
Minimum 44.200 Minimum 41.300 
Maximum 56.400 Maximum 59.700 
 
Determinants of Team Performance 
 In order to determine the impact of each performance statistic on a team’s winning 
percentage, two basic regressions are used. The first utilizes Fenwick percentage as the 
proxy for puck possession, while the second uses Corsi percentage as the proxy for puck 
possession: 
 Equation 1: 
 PP = α + β1FP + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG +  ε 
Where: PP = Point Percentage; FP = Fenwick Percentage; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting 
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game 
  
 Equation 2: 
 PP = α + β1CP + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG +  ε 
Where: PP = Point Percentage; CP = Corsi Percentage; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting 
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game 
 
The results are shown in Exhibit 5. 
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Exhibit 5: Performance Indicator Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Point Percentage 
 Sample Size: 180 Mean Dependent Variable: 55.85833 
 Equat Constant 
Fenwick 
Pct 
Corsi 
Pct 
Face-off 
Pct 
Shooting
Pct 
Save 
Pct 
Turnovers 
Per Game 
Takeaways 
Per Game R2 
1 
−398.731      
(−11.64)      
1.617     
(13.75)  
0.1423     
(0.772) 
3.831 
(9.727)  
 3.661 
(10.21) 
0.1302 
(0.685) 
-0.2659 
(-1.066) 0.701 
2 
−367.927       
(−10.19) 
 1.505       
(12.15) 
0.1502       
(0.758) 
3.721 
(8.907)  
 3.405 
(8.965) 
0.0593 
(0.294) 
-0.3539 
(-1.338) 0.662 
Source: Appendix A 
 
Both regressions show the relationship between performance statistics and point 
percentage using a linear model. Model 1 has a higher R2 value than Model 2, suggesting 
Fenwick percentage is a slightly better predictor of team performance than Corsi 
percentage.  Model 1 shows us that for every one percent increase in Fenwick Percentage, a 
team’s winning percentage increases 1.6 percent, on average, holding all else constant. The 
results also show that for every one percent increase in shooting percentage, a team’s 
winning percentage increases just under 4 percent on average, while a one percent 
increase in save percentage increases a team’s winning percentage by about 3.6 percent on 
average, ceteris paribus. 
 Model 2 shows similar results as Model 1 as for every one percent increase in Corsi 
percentage, on average, a team’s winning percentage is estimated to increase 1.5 percent. A 
one percent increase in shooting percentage is expected to raise winning percentage by 3.7 
percent holding all else constant. Finally a one percent increase in save percentage 
increases winning percentage by 3.4 percent on average, holding all else constant. 
 Face-off percentage, turnovers per game, and takeaways per game did not produce 
significant coefficients in either model. NHL general managers can use these results to 
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more efficiently fill the needs of their respective teams. For example, a team with a low 
shooting percentage can greatly benefit from acquiring a player or players with high 
shooting percentages. This is similar to the situation in our first case study, which shows 
that the use of advanced statistics is being used by NHL general managers on making 
personnel decisions.   
 
Case Study 1: The Pittsburgh Penguins’ acquisition of James Neal  
 Before the 2011 trade deadline, the Pittsburgh Penguins were looking to bolster 
scoring depth heading into the playoffs. The organizations top two players (Sidney Crosby 
and Evgeni Malkin) were both out of the line-up with injuries. Penguins director of player 
personnel Dan MacKinnon consulted with The Sports Analytics Institute (SAI), a company 
that researches and predicts the results of trades before executing the deal. The Penguins 
primary target was forward James Neal who they acquired along with Matt Niskanen for 
defenseman Alex Goligoski. Neal was a rising star, however most organizations, including 
the Stars did not value him the same way the Penguins and the Sports Analytics Institute 
did. The reason was a metric referred to by MacKinnon as “conversion rate.” Neal had an 
“ability to produce goals at a high rate based on where he was shooting from, something 
SAI analysts Mike Boyle and Kevin Mongeon felt meant he could score far more often if elite 
players were getting him the puck in better areas on the ice.”15 This is a more refined 
metric comparable to shooting percentage. From the start of the 2011-12 season through 
March of the 2013, James Neal had scored the second most goals in the NHL. The Penguins 
reached the Eastern Conference finals in the 2013 Stanley Cup Playoffs. MacKinnon claims 
                                                        
15 Mirtle, James. 2013 
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the Penguins have not “made an impact decision since then without consulting the 
analytics.”16 The case shows how analytics can be used in order to find higher value in 
players who might be playing on worse teams and therefore are not valued fairly in the 
market. SAI also claims another top-tier NHL team uses their company as a consultant in 
personnel decisions. The company uses shot-quality data as well as puck-possession 
metrics based on shots attempted in order to predict the number of goals a team will score 
over the course of a season.17 The presence of SAI and the impact James Neal’s move to 
Pittsburgh has had on the Penguins shows NHL general managers are increasingly aware of 
the value of advanced statistics and analytics in personnel decisions. 
 
Case Study 2: The Chicago Blackhawks, Multiple Stanley Cups in Study Period 
 While the Detroit Red Wings, Pittsburgh Penguins, and Boston Bruins all made two 
Stanley Cup Finals appearances (winning once each) in the previous six seasons, only the 
Chicago Blackhawks won two Stanley Cups in the past six years. To understand their 
success, the team’s roster will be further studied, specifically how players were acquired 
and the impact the acquisition types have made in terms of the salary cap. Exhibit 6 is the 
Chicago Blackhawk’s roster for the 2009-10 season, with the 25 players in the organization 
that played the most games in the NHL that year. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Mirtle, James. 2013 
17 Mirtle, James. 2013 
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Exhibit 6: 2009-10 Chicago Blackhawks Roster 
Player Position Acquired Games Cap Hit Entry Level 
Burish F Draft - 02 13 $712,500   
Keith D Draft - 02 82 $1,475,000   
Seabrook D Draft - 03 78 $3,500,000   
Byfuglien F/D Draft - 03 82 $3,000,000   
Bickell F Draft - 04 16 $500,000   
Bolland F Draft - 04 39 $3,375,000   
Barker D Draft - 04 51 $3,083,333   
Brouwer F Draft - 04 78 $1,025,000   
Hjalmarsson D Draft - 05 77 $643,333   
Toews F Draft - 06 76 $850,000  EL 
Kane F Draft - 07 82 $875,000  EL 
Hendry D FA - 06 43 $625,000   
Sopel D FA - 07 73 $2,333,333   
Niemi G FA - 08 39 $826,875   
Huet G FA - 08 48 $5,625,000   
Campbell D FA - 08 68 $7,142,875   
Hossa F FA - 09 57 $5,275,000   
Kopecky F FA - 09 74 $1,200,000   
Madden F FA - 09 79 $2,750,000   
Fraser F Trade - 04 70 $700,000   
Sharp F Trade - 05 82 $3,900,000   
Eager F Trade - 07 60 $965,000   
Versteeg F Trade - 07 79 $3,083,333   
Ladd F Trade - 08 82 $1,550,000   
Ebbett F Waiver - 09 10 $487,500   
Source: http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/stats.htm?gameType=2&season=20092010 
Capgeek.com 
 
The 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team featured eleven of the organization’s own draft 
picks. Two of those draft picks, Patrick Kane and Jonathan Toews, were still on their entry-
level contracts. This is critical considering Kane accumulated 88 points and a shooting 
percentage of 11.5 percent while Toews scored 68 points with a 12.4 percent shooting 
percentage. Kane was ranked third on the team with a 13.052 Fenwick rating per game, 
while Toews ranked 11th with a 9.162 Fenwick rating per game. The fact that the 
Blackhawks were able to establish such strong offensive output from entry-level players 
allowed the team to acquire all-star Marian Hossa before the year began, and he led the 
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team with a 14.319 Fenwick rating per game.18 The Blackhawks were able to round out the 
team in free agency with well-established role players such as Tomas Kopecky and John 
Madden. The value added by Toews and Kane far exceeded their value in terms of their 
salaries—this allowed the Chicago Blackhawks to fill their roster with the necessary pieces 
along side the two young stars and ultimately win the Stanley Cup. 
 The 2013 Stanley Cup Champion Chicago Blackhawks returned nine players from 
the 2010 Championship Team. Those players are italicized in Exhibit 7, which shows the 25 
players who played the most games with the Blackhawks that season. 
Exhibit 7: 2012-13 Chicago Blackhawks Roster 
Player Position Acquired Games Cap Hit Entry Level 
Keith D Draft - 02 47 $5,538,462   
Crawford G Draft - 03 30 $2,666,667   
Seabrook D Draft - 03 47 $5,800,000   
Bolland F Draft - 04 35 $3,375,000   
Bickell F Draft - 04 48 $541,667   
Hjalmarsson D Draft - 05 46 $3,500,000   
Toews F Draft - 06 47 $6,300,000   
Kane F Draft - 07 47 $6,300,000   
Kruger F Draft - 09 47 $735,000  EL 
Saad F Draft -11 46 $764,167  EL 
Shaw F Draft -11 48 $577,500  EL 
Hossa F FA - 09 40 $5,275,000   
Mayers F FA - 11 19 $600,000   
Emery G FA - 11 21 $1,150,000   
Carcillo F FA - 11 23 $825,000   
Rozsival D FA - 12 27 $2,000,000   
Bollig F FA -10 25 $575,000   
Brookbank D FA -12 26 $1,250,000   
Sharp F Trade - 05 28 $5,900,000   
Hayes F Trade - 10 10 $654,167  EL 
Stalberg F Trade - 10 47 $875,000   
Leddy D Trade - 10 48 $899,999  EL 
Frolik F Trade - 11 45 $2,333,333   
Oduya D Trade - 12 48 $3,383,333   
Handzus F Trade -13 11 $2,500,000   
Source: http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/stats.htm?season=20122013 
Capgeek.com 
                                                        
18 stats.hockeyanalysis.com 
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   Again, eleven players on the roster were Chicago Blackhawks’ draft picks. Another 
similarity to the 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team is the impact of entry-level players. 
The 2013 Blackhawks had five entry-level players. Of particular interest are Brandon Saad 
and Nick Leddy. Saad finished the season seventh on the team with a Fenwick per game of 
10.956, a mark that bettered Patrick Kane’s 10.731 during the 2012-13 season. Saad 
finished the year with a 10.2 shooting percentage and 27 points in the lockout-shortened 
season, a mark good for fifth on the team. Meanwhile, Nick Leddy ranked second among 
Chicago defenseman in Fenwick per game (5.280) and third in points with 18, only 2 points 
behind Brent Seabrook. Sheldon Brookbank, acquired as a free agent prior to the start of 
the season, led the defense with a 6.9 Fenwick per game rating. Like the 2010 Stanley Cup 
Champion Team, the 2012-13 Blackhawks found a great amount of value in entry-level 
players while filling other needs through free agency. The impact of the players returning 
from the 2010 Championship Team must also be considered. Exhibit 8 shows the teams 
‘core’ players (those returning from the 2009-10 team) salary increases from the previous 
2009-10 season. 
Exhibit 8: Chicago Blackhawks Core Players 
Player Position 12-13 Cap Hit 09-10 Cap Hit Increase 
Keith D $5,538,462  $1,475,000  $4,063,462 
Seabrook D $5,800,000  $3,500,000  $2,300,000 
Bolland F $3,375,000  $3,375,000  $0 
Bickell F $541,667  $500,000  $41,667 
Hjalmarsson D $3,500,000  $643,333  $2,856,667 
Toews F $6,300,000  $850,000  $5,450,000 
Kane F $6,300,000  $875,000  $5,425,000 
Hossa F $5,275,000  $5,275,000  $0 
Sharp F $5,900,000  $3,900,000  $2,000,000 
Source:Capgeek.com 
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 Only two of the Blackhawk’s core players were on the same contract for the 2012-
2013 season as for the 2009-10 season, Marian Hossa and Dave Bolland. Even with no 
increase in either Hossa’s or Bolland’s average salary, the Blackhawks paid these nine 
returning players an average of $2,459, 644 more per year each in 2012-13. However, the 
Blackhawks had not resigned the two highest paid players from the 2010 Stanley Cup 
Champhionship Team, defenseman Brian Campbell ($7,142,875 per year) and goaltender 
Cristobal Huet ($5,625,000 per year). Jonathan Toews finished fourth in the NHL with 35 
points while Kane finished eleventh with 30 points.  Both players achieved a shooting 
percentage of over 16 percent while Marian Hossa shot at 14 percent. Toews led the core 
with a Fenwick per game of 12.75 while Sharp, Hossa, and Kane were all above 10. The 
ultimate result was Chicago ranking second in Fenwick Percentage and fifth in shot 
percentage among all 30 NHL teams. Goaltenders Corey Crawford, Ray Emery and a strong 
defensive corps achieved the eighth ranked save percentage in the NHL.19  
 Chicago’s success has stemmed from drafting well, and developing these players 
along with those acquired early in their careers through trades such as Nick Leddy and 
Patrick Sharp in the AHL. This is evident as on average, NHL teams only have 8.5 players on 
the active roster drafted by the team—in both Stanley Cup years the Blackhawks have had 
11.20 In addition, the performance statistics of entry-level players for the Blackhawks in 
both Stanley Cup years have been comparable to veteran players with multi-million dollar 
contracts. Harnessing this value added by young players has also allowed the Blackhawks 
to gain an edge in performance statistics while remaining under the salary cap. 
 
                                                        
19 stats.hockeyanalysis.com 
20 Kurt, R. 2013 
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Case Study 3: Columbus Blue Jackets Improvement in the 2012 Off-Season 
 The 2011-12 Columbus Blue Jackets finished last place in the entire NHL with a total 
of 65 points in an 82 game season, a point percentage of 0.396. Of particular interest is the 
fact that the Blue Jackets’ roster included All-Star Rick Nash, who scored 30 goals and 
added 29 assists for a total of 59 points. In fact, although Nash had been with the team since 
being drafted in 2002, the Blue Jackets only made the playoffs once, losing to the Detroit 
Red Wings in the first round of the 2009 Stanley Cup Playoffs.21 Nash was widely sought 
after leading up to the 2012 trade deadline, but General Manager Scott Howson did not 
move the star player until the off-season. On July 23, 2012, Nash was traded to the New 
York Rangers for forwards Brandon Dubinsky and Artem Anisimov, and defenseman Tim 
Erixon.22 The players performance statistics for the 2011-12 year and salary cap hit for the 
2012-13 season are detailed in Exhibit 9. 
Exhibit 9: Blue Jackets Trade Nash to Rangers Detailed 
Player 
11-12 
Points 
11-12 Fenwick  
per Game 
11-12  
Shot Pct 
12-13  
Cap Hit 
Rick Nash 59 14.75 8.7 $7,800,000  
     
Brandon Dubinsky 34 10.327 7.3 $4,200,000  
Artem Anisimov 36 8.981 9.8 $1,875,000  
Forward Totals 70 19.308 8.55 $6,075,000  
     
Tim Erixon 2 3.141 0 $900,000 
New CBJ Total 72 22.449 5.7 $6,975,000  
Source:Capgeek.com; stats.hockeyanalysis.com 
 If points are projected solely based on the previous year, the Blue Jackets gained 13 
points while increasing the team Fenwick rating by just under 8. It is also important to 
consider 2011-12 was Erixon’s rookie season in which he only appeared in 18 games. 
When this is coupled with the fact Erixon is a defenseman it is not surprising he did not 
                                                        
21 www.hockey-reference.com/teams/CBJ. 2013 
22 Allen, Kevin. 2012 
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score a goal. If we exclude Erixon in the analysis and focus solely on forwards, the number 
of points scored increases 11, Fenwick per game increases by just over 4.5, shot percentage 
decreases by .15% on average, while the Blue Jackets open just under $1 million in cap 
space even with the Salary of Erixon included. The extra salary cap space is critical when 
considering the Blue Jackets’ other major 2012 off-season roster move. 
 About a month before the Blue Jackets traded Rick Nash, General Manager Scott 
Howson traded three future draft picks to the Philadelphia Flyers for goaltender Sergei 
Bobrovsky who had been splitting time with the highest paid goaltender in the NHL during 
the 2011-12 season, fellow Russian Ilya Bryzgalov. Bobrovsky came to the Blue Jackets on 
the final year of his entry-level contract, with a cap hit of only $900,000.23 His impact on the 
Columbus defensive corps was enormous. Exhibit 10 shows the performance statistics and 
salaries for Columbus Blue Jackets Goaltenders during the 2011-12 and 2012-13 seasons. 
Exhibit 10: Columbus Blue Jackets Goaltending Statistics 
2011-12  Games Save Pct GAA Cap Hit 
Steve Mason 46 0.894 3.39 $2,900,000  
Curtis Sanford 36 0.911 2.60 $600,000  
2012-13         
Steve Mason 13 0.899 2.95 $2,900,000  
Sergei Bobrovsky 38 0.932 2.00 $900,000  
Source: Capgeek.com; NHL.com 
 
During the 2012-13 season, Bobrovsky’s save percentage was .932 while his goals against 
average was a mere 2.00. His save percentage was 3.3 percent higher than Steve Mason’s in 
2012-13 and 3.8 percent higher compared to Mason’s 2011-12. When these stats are 
utilized in the regression findings, we would expect the Blue Jackets winning percentage to 
increase drastically when Bobrovsky became the starting goalie. Exhibit 11 shows the 
                                                        
23 Wyshynski, Greg. 2012 
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estimations of Bobrovsky’s impact on the team’s winning percentage compared to Steve 
Mason. For ease of calculation we will treat the calculations as if each goaltender played 
every game of the season for the team. 
Exhibit 11: Estimated Point Percentage Change Attributable to Sergei Bobrovsky 
 Regression Equation 1 Regression Equation 2 
 
Sv Pct 
Diff 
Sv Pct 
Coef 
Exp. Point Pct 
Change 
Sv Pct 
Diff 
Sv Pct 
Coef 
Exp. Point Pct 
Change 
Estimate 1 3.3% 3.661 12.1 3.3% 3.405 11.2 
Estimate 2 3.8% 3.661 13.9 3.8% 3.405 12.9 
Source: Appendix A & Exhibit 10 
In Exhibit 11, estimate 1 uses the difference between Bobrovsky’s 2012-13 save percentage 
and Mason’s 2012-13 save percentage while estimate 2 uses the difference between 
Bobrovsky’s 2012-13 save percentage and Steve Mason’s 2011-12 save percentage. 
Estimate 1 is a better indicator of the value in terms of point percentage Bobrovsky added 
because it directly compares the goaltenders playing behind the same team. The estimates 
show Bobrovsky increased the team’s expected point percentage by between 11.2 and 13.9 
percent. With the team earning 39.6% of the possible points in 2011-12 the team’s point 
percentage would be expected to increase to between 50.8% and 53.5% had Bobrovsky 
played every game of the 2012-13 season. In fact, the team earned 55 of a possible 96 
points during the 2012-13 season, or 57.3% of the teams possible points. This means that 
although Bobrovsky added significant value to the Blue Jackets in terms of winning 
percentage, the increased production provided by the acquisition of Dubinsky and 
Anisimov (2 good players) for Rick Nash (1 great player) likely affected the team’s success 
positively. The trade provided the Blue Jackets with greater depth and may be a model for 
other small market teams with one or two all-star caliber players but not much team depth 
beyond their top player or line. 
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 Even though the Blue Jackets saw their point percentage increase by 17.7% from the 
2011-12 season to the 2012-13 season, they missed the playoffs. The Blue Jackets tied with 
the Minnesota Wild for the eighth and final playoff spot in the Western Conference at 55 
points apiece. The Wild won the tiebreaker, wins excluding shootout wins, eliminating the 
Blue Jackets from a chance to win the Stanley Cup. Although, the Blue Jackets failed to reach 
the playoffs the strong and sudden improvement of team performance is worth studying 
for NHL general managers. 
 
Case Study 4: Stanley Cup Finalists from Past Six Seasons 
 Ultimate success in the NHL is winning the Stanley Cup, therefore the Stanley Cup 
finalists will be analyzed to determine their performance in the statistics studied compared 
to the performance of all teams. The teams studied are listed in Exhibit 12. 
Exhibit 12: Past Six Stanley Cup Finals 
Year Champion Runner-Up 
2012-13 Chicago Blackhawks Boston Bruins 
2011-12 Los Angeles Kings New Jersey Devils 
2010-11 Boston Bruins Vancouver Canucks 
2009-10 Chicago Blackhawks Philadelphia Flyers 
2008-09 Pittsburgh Penguins Detroit Red Wings 
2007-08 Detroit Red Wings Pittsburgh Penguins 
 
 The data from these twelve teams was compiled (See Appendix B). Descriptive 
statistics of this data set are shown in Exhibit 13. 
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Exhibit 13: Descriptive Statistics of Stanley Cup Finalists 
Point Percentage  Takeaways per Game  
Mean 65.167 Mean 6.508 
Standard Deviation 6.994 Standard Deviation 1.356 
Minimum 53.700 Minimum 5.170 
Maximum 80.200 Maximum 9.730 
Shooting Percentage  Turnovers per Game  
Mean 7.962 Mean 7.633 
Standard Deviation 0.830 Standard Deviation 0.830 
Minimum 6.350 Minimum 6.610 
Maximum 9.490 Maximum 9.390 
Save Percentage  Corsi Percentage  
Mean 92.446 Mean 53.400 
Standard Deviation 0.876 Standard Deviation 4.131 
Minimum 90.720 Minimum 45.200 
Maximum 93.420 Maximum 59.500 
Faceoff Percentage  Fenwick Percentage  
Mean 51.558 Mean 53.567 
Standard Deviation 3.154 Standard Deviation 3.852 
Minimum 46.100 Minimum 46.400 
Maximum 56.400 Maximum 59.700 
Source: Appendix B 
When compared to the descriptive statistics of the original data set (Exhibit 4), some 
interesting patterns emerge. We would expect the mean of every statistic to increase with 
the exception of turnovers per game. The mean point percentage of Stanley Cup Finalists is 
over 9 percent higher than the average NHL team. This is important, as over half the teams 
in the NHL make the playoffs, meaning teams near the average point percentage can in 
theory win the Stanley Cup. The idea that a general manager’s goal is to create a playoff 
caliber team and that once they reach the playoffs anything can happen is central to Billy 
Beane’s management style in baseball.24 The 2009-10 Philadelphia Flyers seem to support 
Beane’s idea of the playoffs, as their 53.7 percent point percentage was lower than average, 
but earned them the eighth spot in the Eastern Conference that year. The team reached the 
Stanley Cup Final despite their below-average regular season before losing to the Chicago 
                                                        
24 Lewis, Michael. 2003 
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Blackhawks. However, closer examination shows teams that win the Stanley Cup have done 
far more than merely perform good enough to reach the playoffs. The lowest winning 
percentage for a Stanley Cup winning team in the past six years belonged to the 2011-12 
Los Angeles Kings at 57.9 percent. While the Flyers and Kings were around the average in 
their Stanley Cup Final years, the remainder of the Stanley Cup Finalists from the 2007-08 
to 2012-13 seasons all achieved point percentages above 60 percent, 4 percent higher than 
the overall average point percentage. When evaluated as a group the Stanley Cup Finalists 
averaged a 65.2% point percentage, much higher than the overall point percentage average 
of 55.9%, which would in theory make the playoffs. Therefore, Beane’s attitude that 
analytics should be used only to get a playoff team at which point randomness prevails 
does not seem to transfer from baseball to hockey. 
 Also of interest are the Fenwick and Corsi percentages of Stanley Cup Finalist Teams 
compared to the overall average. Other than point percentage, these are the statistics that 
the mean value of Stanley Cup Finalists differs the most from the overall average. The mean 
Corsi percentage for Stanley Cup Finalists is 53.4 percent while the overall average is just 
under 50 percent. Similarly, Stanley Cup Finalists achieve a Fenwick percentage of 53.6 
percent while the overall average is again just under 50 percent. Using these percentages 
as puck possession proxies once again, we can assume Stanley Cup Finalists posses the 
puck about 3.5% more than the average NHL team. The only teams to achieve Fenwick 
and/or Corsi percentages under 50 percent and still reach the Stanley Cup Finals were the 
2007-08 and 2008-09 Pittsburgh Penguins. The 2007-08 team lost to Detroit in the finals 
after achieving a Corsi percentage of 45.2 and a Fenwick percentage of 46.4 during the 
regular season. Their subpar puck possession proxies were likely offset by a high shooting 
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percentage of 8.5, the third highest among all Stanley Cup Finalists studied. Similarly, the 
2008-09 Penguins achieved a Corsi percentage of only 49.2, while the team’s Fenwick 
percentage was above the overall average at 50.1 percent. The Penguins avenged their 
finals loss from the previous year by defeating the Detroit Red Wings. The 2008-09 
Penguins achieved the best shooting percentage of any Stanley Cup Finalist studied at just 
under 9.5 percent, which likely offset the team’s relatively average puck possession. 
 As a whole, Stanley Cup Finalists perform better in the regular season than the NHL 
average, which generally is considered as a playoff team. However, this is not to say a team 
with a point percentage that far exceeds the NHL average will also be above average in each 
performance statistic studied. The study of Stanley Cup Finalists seems to suggest that the 
most successful teams are able to offset areas of the team that are average with other areas 
that are extremely strong. In addition, the 2009-10 Flyers show there is an element of 
randomness, momentum, and chemistry, all intrinsic to hockey that carry over from 
regular season play to the playoffs. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Interpretation of Findings 
 Four different performance statistics showed a positive and significant correlation 
to team success, measured in terms of point percentage. The first regression tested showed 
Fenwick percentage, shot percentage, and save percentage as reliable indicators of team 
performance. The second regression replaced Fenwick percentage with Corsi percentage 
with the results showing Corsi percentage, shot percentage, and save percentage as 
relevant indicators of a team’s success. From these two regressions we can draw some 
meaningful conclusions for NHL general managers attempting to put together the most 
competitive team possible. First, both puck possession proxies (Fenwick and Corsi) are 
positively correlated with team success. This shows these metrics are valuable tools to 
evaluating players, although some NHL general managers disagree.25  
Similarly, capitalization percentages such as shot percentage and save percentage 
have a major impact on the success of a team as evidenced by the results of both 
regressions. Anecdotal evidence from Case Study 1 supports these findings as the 
Pittsburgh Penguins and the Sports Analytics Institute used “conversion rate” to determine 
James Neal was worth more in reality than his market value would have led others to 
believe. Case Study 2 shows the importance of drafting well, the use of the AHL, and 
capitalizing on players still on their entry-level contracts while making significant 
contributions in terms of puck possession proxies, shooting percentage, and ultimately 
points. Although the Blackhawks were unable to retain the services of some crucial players 
from their 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team, the organization replaced them in a span 
                                                        
25 Hawerchuk, 2012. 
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of three years with entry-level players such as Nick Leddy and Brandon Saad to win 
another Stanley Cup in 2013. 
 Case Study 3 shows how star players might be over valued in the trade or free agent 
market. Although Rick Nash led the Columbus Blue Jackets in points, the team did not have 
the depth to realistically compete for a playoff spot in 2011-12. By trading Nash to acquire 
more depth, the Blue Jackets were able to improve puck possession and ultimately 
performance. In addition, the acquisition of goaltender Sergei Bobrovsky and the difference 
he made on the team’s save percentage made a large impact on the team’s performance, 
ultimately contributing to the Blue Jackets improving their point percentage by over 17 
percent. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, both sabermetrics and traditional statistics are useful for evaluating 
team performance. Fenwick, Corsi, shot percentage, and save percentage are all statistics 
NHL general managers should consider when making personnel decisions. These statistics 
have the potential to highlight players that will impact the team’s point percentage greatly, 
even though the market does not value a player as highly. The introduction of entry-level 
contract limits in the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement has provided general 
managers a great tool to increase a team’s success with a minimal cap hit. This is evident in 
the success of the Chicago Blackhawks over the past 4 NHL seasons as well as by the 
improvement of the Columbus Blue Jackets, arguably due to the acquisition of entry-level 
goaltender Sergei Bobrovsky. The quality of players signed in free agency or acquired in 
trades has been shown to work in both ways. In Case Study 2 the depth of the Chicago 
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Blackhawks and contributions of entry-level players Jonathan Toews and Patrick Kane in 
the 2009-10 season allowed high priced and high quality free agent signings Brian 
Campbell and Marian Hossa to increase team success. However, Case Study 3 shows how a 
team with one great player can achieve more success by trading him for several good 
players and increasing team depth. Although the Blue Jackets lost Rick Nash, they added 
Brandon Dubinsky, Artem Anisimov, and Sergei Bobrovsky for roughly the same price as 
Nash would have cost them. This shows how in some situations it is to the team’s benefit to 
acquire several players for the price of one all-star caliber player. The general manager 
must be able to determine the amount of depth on his team and determine what areas need 
to be improved.  
The findings of this study help to show how a general manager can determine what 
trade-offs are necessary to improve his team’s success. Case Study 4 shows that as a whole, 
teams who make the Stanley Cup Finals are far better than teams who merely make the 
playoffs even during the regular season. This means Billy Beane’s theory for baseball, that 
once the playoffs start all teams have an equal chance to win the title, does not hold true in 
hockey. In addition, the study shows the most successful NHL teams are able to offset their 
average or below average areas with at least one exceptionally strong area.  
 There are limitations to this study. First of all, it is hard to determine exactly how 
the rule changes in the NHL CBA agreed to in January of 2013 will impact the market. This 
is because the season was limited to 48 games and the statistics from the recently opened 
2013-14 season were not included in the study. In addition, the impact of the 2005 NHL 
CBA on general managers decision-making was limited because the sabermetric statistics 
of Fenwick and Corsi could not be collected prior to the start of the 2007-08 season. The 
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true impacts of a single free agent signing or trade is very hard to calculate due to the fact 
that hockey is largely based on teamwork and chemistry, these variable are difficult to 
measure, which may account for variance in a player’s or team’s performance from year to 
year. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 In conclusion, the analytical approach to studying hockey is effective and many NHL 
general managers are using sabermetric principles in their decision-making. However, the 
scientific study of hockey is in its infancy and needs to be further studied. Notable areas 
that should be studied further include shot quality and scoring chances. Further study in 
these areas will allow for a better understanding of goal scoring potential for forwards and 
defensemen as well as a better measurement for goal prevention for defensemen and 
especially goaltenders. Possession time studies for each zone (offensive, defensive, and 
neutral) can also give more insight into exactly how puck possession plays a role in 
winning hockey games. For example, how does the zone in which a team has the puck 
impact success and how does it compare to the fact their opponent does not have it? In 
order to help evaluate players for the draft and those in the minors, further study should be 
completed on how performance statistics of players in junior leagues, the college ranks, 
and the AHL translate to success in the NHL. 
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Appendix A 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-180 
Dependent variable: PP 
 
             coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------- 
  const      −398.731      34.2680      −11.64     1.75e-23 *** 
  FP           1.61741     0.117663     13.75     1.54e-29 *** 
  FOP           0.142324    0.184451      0.7716   0.4414   
  SP            3.83129     0.393865      9.727    4.11e-18 *** 
  SVP           3.66129     0.358575     10.21     1.87e-19 *** 
  TOG          0.130247    0.190264      0.6846   0.4945   
  TAG         −0.265880    0.249424     −1.066    0.2879   
 
Mean dependent var   55.85833   S.D. dependent var   7.963084 
Sum squared resid    3392.943   S.E. of regression   4.428588 
R-squared            0.701076   Adjusted R-squared   0.690709 
F(6, 173)            67.62370   P-value(F)           8.31e-43 
Log-likelihood      −519.6936   Akaike criterion     1053.387 
Schwarz criterion    1075.738   Hannan-Quinn         1062.449 
 
Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 19 (TOpG) 
 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-180 
Dependent variable:  
PP 
 
             coefficient    std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
  const      −367.927       36.1240      −10.19     2.21e-19 *** 
  CP           1.50505      0.123913     12.15     6.05e-25 *** 
  FOP           0.150215     0.198178      0.7580   0.4495   
  SP            3.72135      0.417818      8.907    7.07e-16 *** 
  SVP           3.40541      0.379837      8.965    4.91e-16 *** 
  TOG          0.0593116    0.201874      0.2938   0.7693   
  TAG         −0.353920     0.264558     −1.338    0.1827   
 
Mean dependent var   55.85833   S.D. dependent var   7.963084 
Sum squared resid    3831.509   S.E. of regression   4.706108 
R-squared            0.662438   Adjusted R-squared   0.650730 
F(6, 173)            56.58295   P-value(F)           2.74e-38 
Log-likelihood      −530.6341   Akaike criterion     1075.268 
Schwarz criterion    1097.619   Hannan-Quinn         1084.330 
 
Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 19 (TOpG) 
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Appendix B 
 
Stanley Cup Finalists from Past Six Seasons 
Team 
Point 
Pct 
Goals per 
Game 
GA per 
Game 
Shots per 
Game 
SA 
per G 
FO 
Pct 
Fenwic
k Pct 
Corsi 
Pct 
Shot 
Pct 
Save 
Pct 
TO  
Game 
TA 
Game 
2012-13 BOSTON 64.6 2.65 2.21 32.4 28.6 56.4 54.5 55 8.18 93.31 8.38 5.79 
2012-13 CHICAGO 80.2 3.1 2.02 31.1 26.2 50.8 56.1 55.4 8.29 92.41 7.19 9.73 
2011-12 LOS ANGELES 57.9 2.29 2.07 30.6 27.4 51.5 53.7 54.9 6.35 93.38 9.39 5.51 
2011-12 NEW JERSEY 62.2 2.63 2.5 27.5 26.8 47.1 51.1 51 6.93 92.14 7.71 5.93 
2010-11 BOSTON 62.8 2.98 2.3 32.9 32.7 51.9 50.8 51.1 8.41 93.42 6.61 5.17 
2010-11 VANCOUVER 71.3 3.15 2.2 32 30.1 54.9 53.5 53.7 7.86 93.38 6.77 7.27 
2009-10 CHICAGO 68.3 3.2 2.48 34.1 25.1 52.4 58.1 56.9 8.69 90.72 6.71 8.33 
2009-10 PHILADELPHIA 53.7 2.83 2.71 31.6 28.6 50.1 51.3 50.5 7.48 92.23 8.1 6.82 
2008-09 DETROIT 68.3 3.52 2.93 36.2 27.7 55.1 57.5 58.4 7.61 91.45 7.43 5.43 
2008-09 PITTSBURGH 60.4 3.15 2.84 29 30.3 49.1 50.1 49.2 9.49 92.86 7.96 5.71 
2007-08 DETROIT 70.1 3.07 2.18 34.4 23.5 53.3 59.7 59.5 7.75 91.6 8.27 6.54 
2007-08 PITTSBURGH 62.2 2.93 2.58 27.7 30.8 46.1 46.4 45.2 8.5 92.45 7.07 5.87 
Source: NHL.com; stats.hockeyanalysis.com 
